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Philosophy of Science - problems in philosophy of physics

Homepage . Albert Einstein . Isaac Newton . Rene Descartes . William Gilbert ........ General Image Theory

Science, or 'natural philosophy', emerged in the 1500's as a new way of establishing truths relating to our universe - and as a challenge to the philosophy which till then had considered that as its domain. Religions also often considered truths relating to our universe as their domain, but while scientists often presented their ideas as 'theories', most of them certainly considered that they alone were dealing with provable fact - unlike the 'mere theorising' of philosophy and religion though such might also have truths.

But little is taught on the basic conflict of science, philosophy and religion, and how they deal with the basic questions of truth and error discussed below. Can any science or science theory be definitely proven true, and if that is possible then exactly how can any science or science theory be definitely proven true or definitely proven untrue ?

Problems with science philosophy.

Science developed as a new means of proving truths, against the many errors presents as truths by the older philosophers like Aristotle that were often backed by churches and governments. While science disputes truth claims of philosophy and religion as 'just philosophising', philosophy and religion dispute truth claims of science as 'just a theory'. So to look into this requires first examining the three basic ways in which people have considered that a truth might be demonstrated ;

1. GOD. Some hold that there must definitely be a god, and that therefor what are necessary consequences of that must also be definite truths A, B, C which can be used in combination with some logic and observation to demonstrate a wider range of definite truths. In this science/philosophy the god truths are the fundamental truths to which universe truths are secondary, perception being uncertain and god coming before and creating the universe. Rene Descartes took this as the general philosophy of his physics, and others have taken this general position.

2. LOGIC. Some hold that starting from some few definite logical truths, logical deduction can be used to demonstrate a wider range of definite truths. This can involve seeing both god and perception as being uncertain, and debated logic and mathematics as being more reliable. Measured observation often showed that mathematically definable laws applied in nature, so mathematical logic seen as reliable could be used in science. The early Kepler and Albert Einstein perhaps basically took this as the philosophy of their physics, involving logic in combination with a little observation, and others have taken this general position. Some extend Newton's blackbox physics position to 'the only thing science theory needs is the best mathematics'. Support for logic in science has mostly involved a requirement of logical consistancy in theories, though Einstein and some others concluded that such was unnecessary and support light both being a wave and being not a wave.

3. OBSERVATION. Some hold that what you can be sure is true is basically what you can see or touch, and that verifiable observation is key to demonstrating truths. William Gilbert took this position strongly and experimental observation in combination with minimal deductive logic became central to early science in demonstrating a wider range of proven truths. Basically this position takes confirmed perception as most certain, and a theory is to be proved or disproved only by appropriate experimental observations fitting with it or conflicting with it, with minimal deduction. But measured observation showed that mathematics seemed to have a strong place in science, so mathematical logic was often taken as allowing of more than minimal deduction in science.

However, each of these three things on their own can either be shown to contain some uncertainties or can demonstrate only a limited range of truths. This is why many scientists have supported using combinations of two or three of them, while often perhaps taking one as being more fundamental. The various positions taken on this by physicists have depended chiefly on their evaluation of three issues ;

A. On the use of minimal logic in science. Early science generally supported observation with 'close logic' or 'minimal logic' involving only deductions that seemed to derive directly from experiments. This was seen as according with the fact that repeated observation of our varied and complex universe showed that its fundamental behaviours were relatively simple, and with Occam who concluded that logic works best when it involves minimal assumptions. This perhaps best suited small physics theories, as one theory for mechanics and another theory for planet motion etcetera. Each small theory would need few assumptions or deductions.

B. On the place of simplicity in science. Early scientists tended to concentrate experiments on particular areas, such as mechanics or magnetism etcetera, and this helped them to conclude that nature basically followed simple laws. This supported the conclusion that a more simple science theory with fewer assumptions is more likely true than a less simple theory with more assumptions. But Isaac Newton changed that view somewhat when he showed that some one theory might explain both terrestrial gravity and planet motion - which till then had involved two different theories. If one theory with 4 assumptions could explain all that two theories each with 3 assumptions explained, then one more complex theory seemed relatively simpler than two absolutely simpler theories. So to some a more complex theory seemed acceptable if it explained more, science simplicity would have to be sacrificed to science coverage. So even Rene Descartes trying to produce a full-coverage physics theory from a simple mechanics base only, had to add complexities to try to cover gravity, magnetism and electricity.

C. On the fundamentals of science. Early physics first split into two camps as to what was really fundamental in our physical universe. Galileo, Descartes and others concluded that the universe was fundamentally mechanical - where its key properties were only matter solidity, matter motion and matter contact. But some like Gilbert concluded that the universe was fundamentally based on response to signals - where its key properties were only attraction or other motion response to gravitational, magnetic, electrical and maybe other signals. Kepler, Einstein and others held as a third position supporting neo-mechanical 'fields' and that these were fundamental if not exclusive in our universe. Of course some physicists concluded that nothing was exclusively fundamental, and accepted some two or three of these as being different aspects of our universe that are compatible. Physicists holding different positions on what is fundamental in the universe, have supported very different types of theories. The issue of what is fundamental in the universe can be entwined with the issue of what is fundamental in observing the universe. And there is Isaac Newton and a few others holding that as science can only observe appearances and apparent behaviours, and not the actual causes of those, then a science theory should omit all unseen causes and must leave discussion of such fundamentals to philosophy. And more specifically Newton showed that if physics was to include unseen causes then there may be no scientific way to choose between two different physics and that one theory seeming right could not itself disprove an alternative theory which might also seem equally right.

D. On mathematics and science. Some see mathematical laws as fundamental in science, though mathematics certainly itself has problems for science. Hence Newton did not put his three laws of motion as mathematical equations for good reasons. Action and reaction being equal and opposite is generally handled in mathematics with positive and negative where perhaps nature has no negative. So gravity pulls on a body by two bodies either side of it can be termed positive and negative and may yield zero, while no actual negative gravity is involved and the reality is quite different if bodies are closer than if they are farther though the mathematics for both may yield the same zero. The mathematics of different physics theories also often involves constants or other elements whose actual physical meaning is quite unclear or ambiguous so that they effectively represent physical unseens. Opposite electric charges are undoubtedly both positive forces that can 'cancel out', but something having one of each is not the same as something having neither. And mathematics also can really only deal with futures or non-existants, like the idea of 'potential energy' ('energy which will exist if'), as if they actually exist when they do not. (this particular example achieved no mention in the classic laws of motion and laws of thermodynamics, and maybe only really fitted Gilbert active-matter theory, but is now taken by some as an actual existant rather than a potential existant.) Of course special forms of mathematics like vector mathematics and others can seemingly 'solve' some of these issues, but generally mathematics and nature actually go together much less easily than many imagine. But some do extend Newton's blackbox physics position to 'the only thing science theory needs is the best mathematics'.

So what do these basic issues now indicate for our basic questions - can any science theory be definitely proven true, and if so then exactly how can a science theory be definitely proven true or definitely proven untrue ? Conside 3 types of theory ;

1. If we take a small science theory saying only that on Earth all bodies tend to fall towards the Earth with an acceleration whose value decreases as the square of its distance from the centre of the Earth, then this says nothing about assumed causes, and only involves some generalisation of some verifiable observations. Most scientists would take that small science theory as fully provable, and perhaps as fully proved if many people had made many observations over many years. Would that still hold if observations were by only one person, and if observations were of only a few bodies and if observations were over only a small time period ? Most scientists would probably say that the theory could reasonably be taken as proven for as long as no observation conflicts with it, and taken as disproved as soon as one verifiable observation does conflict with it. This position of course involves the small theory never being definitely proved, but some would say that it is reasonable to take it as being definitely proved as long as it does not specify 'forever'.

2. If we take a somewhat larger science theory saying only that all bodies in the universe tend to move towards other bodies with an acceleration whose value decreases as the square of its distance from the centre of the other body and increases as the mass of the other body, then this again says nothing about assumed causes, and only involves a greater generalisation of some verifiable observations. Most scientists would take that somewhat larger science theory as fully provable, and perhaps as fully proved if many people had made many observations over many years. But again would that still hold if observations were by only one person, and if observations were of only a few bodies and if observations were over only a small time period ? And some of the needed observation being of distant bodies, can their movements and masses truely be observed accurately ? Some would probably say that this theory is less easily taken as fully proved because observations cannot ever easily cover the whole universe, yet some would probably say that this theory is MORE easily taken as fully proved because it is logically simpler - it looks more inherent to matter and to be a priori and 'forever'. In fact this theory of Newton was taken as proved but was later taken as disproved as some observations relating to distant bodies were claimed to conflict with it.

3. If we take a bigger science theory and it includes claimed explanations, then the proof question changes. But the changes are like the move from small theory to somewhat larger theory above, with observation reasons for accepting a big theory as growing harder to prove but with 'logical simplicity' reasons to accept it as seemingly growing easier to prove. A theory of everything needs only one set of assumptions, where several smaller theories need several sets of assumptions.

EXPERIMENT. Now on disproving a science theory, we have noted the idea that observation conflicting with a theory disproves it. Of course some observations may be less reliable than others, as perhaps with observing some light in the sky - are we truely directly observing some moving star accurately or has the light perhaps undergone some abberations of which we are unaware ? Such uncertainty may seem likely because of conflicting theories of light and perhaps limited knowledge of light. Hence Einstein's theory seems to require that light be gravitationally attracted to massive bodies which is a process tending to accelerate things, yet Einstein's theory also required that light could not be accelerated beyond the speed of light - and currently there certainly also remain other tricky light issues like assumptions regarding light 'red shifts'. Yet there are current physics and astronomy theories dependent on perhaps uncertain distant light observations.

INVENTION. With progress in science has generally come progress in useful inventions like TV and the internet, so that some might think of new inventions as proving a science theory true. However useful invention started before science and 'blind' experiment has certainly given many new inventions, though sometimes a science theory has prompted a new experiment and new invention. Science encourages invention less by the truth of science theory, than simply by science encouraging experiment. So even false science can help invention, and invention cannot be taken as reliable proof of the truth of any science theory. (one common false belief now is that nuclear power came from, and so proves, Einstein's theory - when it actually came from experiments on radioactivity that were making good progress before Einstein's theory.)

RELATIVITY. If things like light and gravity are taken as being signals carrying information about source objects or events, then they might carry correct absolute information or they might be liable to abberations and then carry incorrect appearance information - and information may be modified by its observation and so be relative to the observer. Hence in considering a distant objects motion and mass, it may be necessary to consider its absolute, apparant and relative motion and mass. If as Newton noted it is not possible to absolutely distinguish a body being at rest from a body in uniform motion, that need not mean that there is no real difference or that velocity is of no significance. But things like light and gravity can be not only information signals, but also have some absolute effects on real objects so that perhaps the apparant or relative can also have absolute effects. And the effects on some bodies of signals that are in some respect relative, may be to some non-relative aspect of them. So normal debate underlying science theory, about taking things as being only absolutes as against taking things as being only apparant or relative, may be trying to distinguish the two too much - our universe undoubtedly includes both. And that fact can affect how science theories should be proved or disproved.

SCALE. The behavior laws of large masses of things can appear to differ greatly from the behaviour laws of the individual things. An ocean does not seem to behave like one water molecule behaves, or at least their behaviours can be described quite differently. Are such scale differences real differences or are some or all only apparant differences ? This issue may fundamentally concern how both 'small-scale' quantum physics and 'large-scale' relativity physics relate to 'medium-scale' classical physics theories. See one recent interesting Scientific American physics theory article relating to this by Renate Loll (though he maybe believes in some mathematical universe, like the young Kepler before he wised up).

DEFINITIONS. The extent to which a science theory has clear and complete definitions for the things that it deals with, determines the extent to which the theory is provable or is disprovable. A very vague theory is hard to prove or to disprove, and perhaps should not be considered a science theory at all. And is a mathematical definition of something physical a real definition or maybe not ? Hence for acoustics there has long been used a clear physical definition of a sound wave, but for optics the definition of light waves has varied and now is perhaps only mathematical and so physically undefined ? Some modern physics theories seem to have weak definitions of even their basics like mass, energy and space.

Of course in reality most science theories will consist of some small set of basics essential to that theory, and some larger set of correctly or incorrectly derived assumed consequential deductions. A theory may also include some explanation of its language terminology and usage which may or may not also include some elements essential to it. The larger set of derived consequences in a theory is more likely to include some deduction errors that can be proved wrong. But proving some small inessential bits of a theory wrong does not actually disprove the theory, only disproving one of its essentials can fully disprove a theory. And sometimes it may not be clear exactly what the real essentials of a particular theory are. So an apparant disproof of a theory may not be a real disproof. It will often be easier to just push a new theory rather than to try to really disprove an old theory, and often new theories have mainly gained support that way - in fact leaving old theories disapproved but not disproved.

Experiment and observation conflicts are not the only things that have been taken as proving or disproving a science theory. There are cases where a theory has been taken as disproved by a new theory, with no observation conflicts. This displacing of one science theory by another can be on good science grounds as when a new theory has fewer assumptions, or can be actually on non-science grounds as when a new theory wins support for being better in line with the religion, politics or prevailing attitudes of the time. Even scientists are human. And in the end public 'proof' is what some humans take as proof, and may not always be definite proof. Definite proof may not always be possible in science, or elsewhere ?

There have been many more imagined disproofs of science theories than real disproofs of science theories. Claimed science theory disproofs very often involve errors, often relating to the fact that theories commonly fail to clearly and fully define the fundamentals that they rest on and often also include inessential deductions that are commonly incorrect. Disproofs of science theories can be taken as generally falling into two basic categories ;

1. Experimental Disproofs. Experimental disproof of a science theory is generally taken as requiring some well verified experiment fact conflicting with some essential aspect of the theory, and not just some interpretation of an experiment conflicting with it. Eg a theory requiring that the universe cannot expand is not disproved by some interpretation of light wavelength variations as indicating universe expansion, if the no-expansion theory can allow of such light wavelength variations without expansion. So experimental disproofs can only rest on actual experiment results, and not on any claimed explanation or interpretation of experiment results.

If any required aspect of a theory is disproved then that theory is disproved, but disproof of an inessential aspect of a theory does not disprove the theory. Science theories may often include some deductions that are incorrect but that are also inessential to the theory. Hence William Gilbert deduced incorrectly that the Earth's magnetic signals should not vary over time, but that was not any basic requirement of his theory that magnetism involves emitted signals and responses to them.

2. Compatibility Disproofs. Showing that 2 theories are incompatible, as by showing that their mathematics are incompatible, is generally taken as proving that one or both theories are invalid - but still allows that either theory may be valid. If one required aspect of a theory contradicts another required aspect of the same theory is generally taken as proving that theory is invalid, but if either is not required then that contradiction proves nothing about the theory's validity.

For 2 theories having different coverage but both covering some common area, as 1 theory of mechanics and 1 theory of mechanics and gravity, A. if 1 of the theories is taken as being fully proven then the second theory must be taken as fully proven if shown to be fully compatible with the first theory. B. if 1 of the theories is taken as being disproven then the second theory must be taken as disproven if shown to be fully compatible with the first theory. C. if the 2 theories are shown to be incompatible, then 1 or both must be invalid. D. if the 2 theories are both fully proven, then it must be possible for them to be somehow shown to be compatible.

Of course, it may be easier to show theories to be compatible or incompatible than to fully prove or disprove theories. And while either 1 of 2 theories that are incompatible with each other might be valid, as Newton concluded, contradictions between 2 theories is generally taken as showing that at least 1 of them is not valid. But there are some who now see contradiction within 1 theory, within its mathematics, in results of experiments, and in actual nature, as being acceptable science. Current wide acceptance of particle-wave duality and of Einstein's general theory seems to require that position, though for most of the history of science it was considered unacceptable.

MIND AND MATTER. Another basic issue much disputed by both philosophers and scientists is the issue of Mind and Matter in the material universe.

Early pre-science philosophers generally allowed that both mind and matter exist, often requiring that mind be associated with some matter or with all matter but not existing alone.

As one of the first physicists William Gilbert concluded that his attraction theory experiments proved that all inanimate matter possesses some simple mind properties in being able to detect and respond automatically to magnetic, electric and gravity signals emitted by other matter. Allowing of simple mind in simple matter, and of complex mind and complex matter, allowed a complete 'mind from matter' theory. But the early scientist/philosopher Rene Descartes concluded that there could be no mind beyond God and Humans, and that matter could not respond to anything and could only be pushed by contacts with other matter - a 'no mind' science. He had no mechanism for the human mind to relate to the human body, and required animals to be mechanical clockwork robots. As a philosopher George Berkeley concluded that in the material universe mind was certain and matter uncertain, allowing a 'no matter' Gilbetian science. Isaac Newton's blackbox theory basicaly concluded that any of these positions might be true but science could not prove which - a 'don't worry' science. (though Newton was widely suspected of privately favouring Gilbert attraction theory, and supporting his blackbox physics as being the best physics possible only as long as there were no proven physics theories without unseens) Modern physics theory ignores the major issue of mind, vaguely claiming it is outside physics, though some modern information science does try to consider it as a physics issue. A minimum requirement for the claim that mind is outside of physics would seem to be a real physics disproof of attraction theory which nobody has really managed to produce yet and no modern physicist has even tried.

The Descartes, Berkeley and Newton positions on this general dispute was summed up in the philosopher or physicist ultimate phrase - "No matter ? Never mind !". In common English the phrase 'no matter' has a double meaning as 'don't worry', and 'never mind' also has a double meaning as 'don't worry'. (the phrase may derive from the joke 'What is matter? - never mind. What is mind? - no matter.' which was published in Punch and may have originated with Oscar Wilde.)

Of course although Gilbert's 'no dead matter' physics was somewhat in line with the later 'no matter' philosophy of George Berkeley and opposed by the 'no mind' mechanical physics of Rene Descartes, Gilbert physics does maybe better allow of the compatible existance of both in a universe. If any body can be a signal, relative to some observer body that can respond to it, and any body can be an observer relative to some signal body to which it can respond, then all physical observers, unlike intelligent observers, can always respond to signals in fixed predictable reliable manners. And that may be the real basis of experimental science data, not Descartes human 'certain knowledge' which seems far more uncertain ? And sensing data does not require any 'knowing' or intelligence, though it is certainly required of any science theory that it does add such to given data. The chief requirement of a good science theory remains that it involve the least knowledge assumptions being added to the established data, and some science theories seem to involve much assumption. While science seems to have a strong case in disputing many truth claims of philosophy and religion as 'only philosophising', philosophy and religion seem to have a strong case in disputing truth claims of some science as 'only theory'.

THOUGHT AND SCIENCE. There are in fact 3 quite different but easily confused thought-related issues of basic concern to science theory.

Firstly on producing science theories, many philosophers and some scientists like William Gilbert have been concerned with science having errors due to the thought element involved in producing a science theory. But philosophers perhaps often tend to over-emphasise the 'thought' part of science, as against the experience-experiment-data part, shown by eg George Berkeley and more recently Wilfred Sellars. For developing a scientific theory Gilbert repeatedly supported strongly an anti-philosophising/reasoning and strongly pro-experiment/experience position, requiring that a good theory must be as directly from the data as possible and so involve the least deduction assumptions. Experiment or experience regarding the natural world is NOT entirely dependent on the human senses direct detection of natural signals as some have assumed. Science has developed, and still is further developing, many different detectors of natural signals - many indirect alternative senses. These adding further confirmation of our own human senses add further to the proof value of experiment, and further reduce the proof value of mere 'logical' thought. So the experimental science method as advocated so strongly by Gilbert in 1600 has had, and still now really has, a more solid base than the 'thought experiment' science method as advocated by Einstein and others.

Secondly on the content of science theories, some philosophers and many scientists like Rene Descartes have been concerned with science having errors due to human-like phenomena as especially thought-like phenomena being wrongly ascribed to the non-human universe. Of course it is perhaps not certain that two exclusive universes exist, human vs non-human or spiritual vs material, and modern computer and remote technology does clearly demonstrate that thought-like thoughtless processes exist and could be widespread in the physical universe. So while rejecting theories that incorrectly ascribe thought-like phenomena to some physical processes as 'anthropomorphic' may be sound, labelling a science like Gilbert's signal theory physics 'anthropomorphic' could well be a bigger science mistake.

Thirdly on the descriptions involved in science theories, a few linguistics theoreticians like Noam Chomsky have been concerned with science having errors due to their basically being descriptions of thoughts of a universe and description allowing of ambiguity or other error. This issue is considered more fully in our General Image Theory section.

Science perhaps needs to be concerned with all three of these quite different thought-related issues and not just with some one of them.

CERTAINTY AND SCIENCE. Science has long had a double-edged sword problem on the question of certainty and certain knowledge. On the one hand science must oppose claimed certain knowledge about the universe, with the requirement that knowledge can be gained only after much scientific experience and experiment on all possible aspects of the universe. Galileo and Gilbert were two of the prominent early scientists pushing this need-more-experiments anti-certain-knowledge view of science. But science commonly also supports the idea that there can be only one set of truths, which some few science experiments can prove and so give certain knowledge of the universe. Like some early philosophers including Aristotle, some scientists such as maybe Descartes and Einstein have seemed to be offering certain knowledge. Certain knowledge tends to being popular, even with scientists, but also tends to being wrong knowledge. Newton perhaps alone seemed clearly to argue that there are probably significant limits to scientific knowledge, and that basic 'unseeables' necessarily allowed of alternative views of the universe and no complete certain knowledge. Widespread support for any form of claimed certain-knowledge has always opposed new real science. Yet still today science itself defends the indefensible 'only one right theory' dogma that can only hold science back. Newton's blackbox alternative-theory ideas perhaps still need some developing as along the lines of General Image Theory science ?

And there is the Blackbox Theory song by Bob Marley ;

Don't worry
about a thing.
Every little thing's
gonna be alright.

Basic issues for any piece of science

For any piece of science, experimental evidence may seem to support some event description like 'A=B+C' being true for some aspect of the universe.
The main issues for science regarding that event description are then ;
1. Is this event description exactly accurate, or is this event description just an approximation, or is this event description just one of multiple possible event descriptions for that event ?
2. Is this event description accurate or approximate or one of multiple possible event descriptions for all of that aspect of the universe, for just part of that aspect of the universe, or for more than only that aspect of the universe ?
Of course scientists may then actually work on only some of these issues, and not address all of these issues.

Support for against-the-mainstream Gilbert-Newton attraction physics

Gilbert-Newton 'attraction physics' was supported by some other physicists, and also by some notable people outside physics like the chemist-physicist Priestley and the philosopher Kant.

Joseph Priestley rejected solidity and saw 'contact-collision' as just repulsion and saw another strength of attraction theory involving robot atoms responding to signals, rather than involving dead atoms, as better allowing of animal and human brains thinking processes. (History of Optics 1772, Disquisitions 1777)

And to Immanuel Kant for any theory attempting to replace attraction with push impacts, the very existence of spatially extended configurations of matter (as objects of above-zero radius) seems to need some sort of binding force to hold the extended parts of the object together. Such a force cannot be explained by pushing from other particles, because those particles too must hold together in the same way, so to Kant circular reasoning in physics is avoidable only if there exists at least one fundamental attractive force. (Metaphysics of Science 1786)

Though such support for attraction theory had little effect on physicists, it remains the case that there are some very strong arguments in favour of attraction physics that Einstein and others have certainly failed to address.

PS. For a very interesting and good if imperfect recent work on some issues of science history and theory from a philosophical viewpoint, see Laura Aline Ward's Objectivity in Feminist Philosophy of Science PDF 250 kb - allow up to 1 minute for this to load !

Two websites to help inform you on what physicists and astronomers are up to lately are Physics World and Universe Today.

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